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In this paper we address the issue of how transmission uncertainty could affect the
choice between a federal monetary policy based on national data and one on
aggregated data.We find that the uncertainty about the transmission process
increases the need to take into account information about national economies in
the formulation of optimal monetary policies in a monetary union.
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The conduct of monetary policy in Euroland is made diﬃcult because of the
existence of asymmetries within the union. Asymmetries exist both at the level
of the macroeconomic shocks to which members of the union are subjected and
at the level of the transmission of monetary policies. Recent theoretical analysis
has shown that the existence of asymmetries in the transmission of monetary
policy actions of the ECB calls for a design of monetary policies that takes into
account national data. Thus, in order for monetary policies to be set optimally
it is not suﬃcient to use aggregated (euro) data on inﬂation and output gaps,
but also to consider non-aggregated national data on these same variables if
asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policies exist (see De Grauwe
(2000) and Gros and Hefeker (2002)). Empirical evidence seems to support this
view in the case of the Federal Reserve System of Central Banks in the United
States (see Meade and Sheets (2002), and Heinemann and H¨ ufner (2002)).
The previous conclusion has been derived in the context of models in which
there is no uncertainty about the transmission process. The issue that arises
here is whether this conclusion continues to hold when uncertainty about the
transmission process exists.
Monetary policy transmission uncertainty is also an important issue in the
European context. According to several economists (see, among others, Dorn-
busch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998), Mihov (2001) and ECB (2001)), the creation
of EMU is likely to have strengthened the degree of uncertainty surrounding the
transmission of monetary policy measures within the Union.
The optimal design of monetary policy when transmission uncertainty ex-
ists has been analysed in detail in the theoretical literature. The main insight
provided by this literature is that transmission uncertainty may call for more
caution from the monetary authorities. Faced with this kind of uncertainty, the
authorities will tend to stabilize less that when no such uncertainty exists (see
Brainard (1967) for the original argument and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999) and Peersman
and Smets (1999) for an application to the European context)1.
In this paper, we develop a model of a monetary union in which the trans-
mission of policy induced changes in the interest rate is asymmetric. We ﬁrst
do this when there is no uncertainty about this transmission process. We then
extend the model allowing for uncertainty in the transmission process. We are
thus able to analyse how the uncertainty and asymmetry issues interact and
how this interaction may impinge on the choice of a monetary strategy in EMU.
1Empirical evidence on the caution principle is more ambiguous (see European Central
Bank (2001)).
22N a t i o n a l versus Union-wide Aggregation: how
to deal with transmission heterogeneity?
2.1 The modelling framework
We use a standard macroeconomic model and apply it to a monetary union
framework. The asymmetry is introduced in the model by considering that the
features of the national Phillips curves diﬀer from one country to the other, so
that:
Ui = U∗
i − ai · (πi − πe
i)+εi
i is the country i =1 ,2,...,N
Ui is the unemployment rate in the country i and U∗
i is its natural counter-
part. ai denotes the transmission parameter of (unexpected) inﬂation impulses
to the unemployment gap. As our objective is to analyse the implications of
asymmetries in transmission, we assume that this coeﬃcient diﬀers across coun-
tries.
We will not assume asymmetry in the shocks. This has been done elsewhere
(see De Grauwe (2000)). We focus on the asymmetries in the transmission pro-
cess because this is where the uncertainty will arise (see infra). Thus, we suppose
that εi = ε for all i. Put diﬀerently, we intend to analyse a world of symmetric
shocks that are transmitted asymmetrically and in which there is uncertainty
about this transmission process.
πi refers to the inﬂation rate of country i. It will be assumed that when the
countries in the model form a monetary union the inﬂation rate is the same in
all countries. We have two reasons to do this. First, as it is usually the case
in the literature, we suppose that the monetary authorities directly control the
inﬂation rate. Second, as monetary policy is determined in a centralised fashion
when a monetary union exists, the member countries share common monetary
conditions in the Union, which should lead to the same rates of inﬂation. There
is of course evidence indicating that inﬂation rates in the eurozone diﬀer across
countries. However, it is likely that those inﬂation diﬀerentials are very much
inﬂuenced by the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. Since this is primarily a structural
feature, it is not very much inﬂuenced by monetary policy.
The single monetary policy in a monetary union can be designed in two
ways.
1- First, the Common Central Bank may choose to minimise a weighted
average of national loss functions. We deﬁne this strategy as a national ag-
gregation (NA) procedure. The national loss function depends on the squared
deviations of inﬂation and output from target levels in the following way:
Li ≡ (πi)
2 + b · (Ui − U∗
i )
2
3where b denotes the relative weight of the unemployment gap with respect
to inﬂation in the loss function. Note that for the sake of convenience we set the
target rate of inﬂation equal to 0. In addition, we assume that the unemploy-
ment target of the authorities coincides with the natural unemployment. As a
result, we disregard issues relating to credibility. Indeed, we want to emphasize
that the monetary authorities are likely to face the heterogeneity in the trans-
mission of monetary policy, their potential time-inconsistency notwithstanding.
In the (NA) scenario therefore, the central bank of the monetary union
determines its optimal strategy by minimising the “average” of the loss functions





µi is the weight associated to country i in the computation of the aggregate
loss function. We have:
Pi=N
i=1 µi =1 .
As the inﬂation rate is common to all the member countries, we may rewrite
the former expression as:
ΛNA(π)=( π)
2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1
µi · (Ui − U∗
i )
2 (1)
Since (Ui − U∗
i ) depends on the (rationally) unexpected component of the
(common) inﬂation rate, ΛNA will be a function of π (for a given value of the
shock, ε). In the following, we deﬁne πNA as the optimal inﬂation rate under
the NA strategy (ie. the one for which ΛNA is minimal).
2- The second scenario refers to a strategy where the Central Bank mini-
mizes a loss function deﬁned in terms of Union-wide aggregate variables, i.e. an
average inﬂation rate and an average unemployment rate. We designate such a














µi · πi = π
2By convention, XNA
i (resp. XEA
i ) will refer in the following to the value taken by the
(endogenous) variable Xi when the so-called national-aggregation (resp. Union-wide) strategy
is implemented by the central bank.
4where the subscript E refers to a variable deﬁned at the Union level.
The relevant loss function may then be deﬁned as follows:
ΛEA ≡ (π)












Because of the linearity of the national Phillips relationships, the aggrega-
tion rule allows for the existence of a Union-wide Phillips “curve” between the
aggregate inﬂation rate and the “mean” unemployment gap. Thus we have
UE = U∗
E − aE · (π − πe)+ε
with aE ≡
PN
1 µi · ai, which could be qualiﬁed as the mean transmission
parameter.
Again we observe that ΛEA is a function of π. In the following we deﬁne
πEA as the optimal inﬂation rate under the EA strategy (ie the one for which
ΛEA is minimal).
Finally, both strategies have to be compared using a common welfare mea-
sure. As we consider an explicit heterogeneity in the transmission mechanisms,
the benchmark used is the weighted average of the ex ante (expected) national








where Eε is the expectation operator taken with respect to the distribution








2.2 Comparison of the strategies
We now examine the properties of the two strategies in more detail.
1- Under the ﬁrst scenario, the Central bank determines πNA such that it
minimises ΛNA subject to the constraint of national Phillips “curves” prevailing
in the member countries while taking as given the value of the shock (ε)a n d
the private sector’s expectations of the inﬂation rate implemented under this
strategy (πe). Thus, we have






i − ai · (π − πe,)+ε, for i =1 ,2,...,N
5Solving this program (including the computation of the rational expected




















1 µi · (ai − aE)
2 which is a
measure of the dispersion in the national transmission parameters3.T h u s ,θ2
aE
measures the asymmetry in the transmission process
We observe that when the asymmetry in the transmission process increases,
the authorities’ optimal inﬂation rate reacts less to shocks. The counterpart of
this lessening in the inﬂation variability is an increasing volatility of the national
unemployment rate with the size in the transmission asymmetry. This is seen
from the following expression of the equilibrium unemployment rate (obtained
by substituting the optimal inﬂation rate in the Phillips curve):
UNA
i = U∗
i +( 1− ΩNA· ai) · ε
2- Under the second scenario, the Central Bank minimises the loss function
based on the Union-wide unemployment and inﬂation rates. The constraint is
then given by the Union-wide Phillips relationship. We obtain:

























1 µi · a2
i
6Note that this is the same optimal inﬂation rate which would be obtained if
the model had been applied to the case of a single country (whose role is played
in our framework by the monetary union).
As in the ﬁrst scenario the equilibrium level of the national unemployment




i +( 1− ΩEA · ai) · ε
From these results we conclude that under a strategy which aims at minimis-
ing the variability of Union-wide variables, the asymmetry in the transmission
of the common supply shocks does not act as a motive for changing the inﬂa-
tion rate and, thereby, for aﬀecting the variability of the national unemployment
rates.
A welfare comparison of both strategies goes through the computation of
the weighted average of expected national losses after having substituted the




2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1








2 + b ·
i=N X
i=1





The relative beneﬁts of a national aggregation strategy versus aU n i o n - w i d e













(1 − ΩEA · ai)




Simplifying this expression4 leads to:
∆W ≡ [(ΩEA) − (ΩNA)] · ΩEA · b · θ2
aE (7)
which is positive as ΩEA > ΩNA.
4On this point, it seems that Gros and Hefeker (2002, p.10) have (mistakenly?) obtained
conditions which are superﬂuous with respect to the result they derive.
7Thus adopting a national aggregation perspective is better than relying on
a Union-wide strategy.
The comparison of the two loss functions may enlight the reasons why the
NA strategy has to be favored5.
Indeed, let deﬁne the unemployment gap, U
g
i ,a s :U
g
i ≡ Ui − U∗
i . Manipu-























2, which can be considered as a measure of
the dispersion between the national unemployment rates.
Deriving this expression leads to two interesting and interrelated properties:
• First, we observe that the two strategies are equivalent if and only if there






is no output goal in the loss function of the monetary authorities (b =0 ) .
• Second, given the framework we have retained, there is only one strat-
egy which would satisfy the welfare maximising criteria we have imposed






3 Introducing parameter transmission uncer-
tainty in an heterogeneous monetary union
In the foregoing, we have shown that adopting a national aggregation perspec-
tive is unambiguously a better strategy to deal with asymmetries in the trans-
mission mechanisms than to rely on Union-wide aggregates. The question that
arises now is whether this conclusion is maintained when we introduce uncer-
tainty about the transmission mechanisms.
5See Annex A for further results on this comparison.











83.1 Uncertainty at diﬀerent levels of aggregation
The latter question is addressed in the model in the following way. Let suppose
that the creation of the monetary Union modiﬁes the Phillips relationship be-
tween national variables so that the coeﬃcient ai c a nn om o r eb ek n o w nw i t h
certainty by the authorities in charge of the common monetary policy but must
be considered as a random variable.
In order to account for this change in regime and to distinguish from non-
random variables in the model, we redeﬁne the national Phillips curve slope
parameter of country i as e ai:
Ui = U∗
i − e ai · (π − πe)+ε (9)
We thus obtain N random variables which, to simplify the analysis, we sup-
pose to be identically and independently distributed with:
Ea (e ai)=ai, ∀i =1 ,...,N
cova (e ai,e aj)=
½
0i f i 6= j
σ2
a if i = j i,j =1 ,...,N
where the subscript a refers to the common (marginal) distribution law of
the system of the N random variables7. Furthermore we suppose that e ai and ε
are not correlated (for all i)
By applying the aggregation rule on the transmission parameters, we are
able to characterise the statistical properties of the Union-wide transmission
coeﬃcient (which thereby becomes a random variable), e aE ≡
PN













Finally, the welfare criterium has to be adjusted to take the presence of
uncertainty into account: it is thus based on the expectation of a weighted
average of the national loss functions, with respect to both the distribution of
7Assuming that the covariances between the e ai w o u l dn o tb ee q u a lt oz e r o( a n dt h u s
that some of the transmission mechanisms would be linked), would not change the results
qualitatively. See why in Annex B.
8It is interesting to note thus that, in such a model, it is not possible to introduce parameter
uncertainty at the Union level without taking it into account at the national level. Such an
assumption would violate the aggregation principle. It would be possible to consider this
distinction if the Phillips relationships were not linear. But in this case, solutions would be
hardly tractable (see Bean (1997)).
9the error term and the random coeﬃcient (which we assume to be independent).
Thus we use in the following, f W ≡ Eε,a
hPi=N
i=1 µi · Li
i
.
1- Let look, ﬁrst, at the Union-wide strategy (euro-aggregation). In an
uncertain setting, the Central Bank considers the expected value of the loss
function deﬁned in terms of the Union-wide variables with respect to the distri-
bution of e aE.T h i sr e ﬂects the assumption that the authorities manage optimally
the uncertain eﬀects of the policy they intend to design. Thus, the monetary






subject to the constraint:
UE = U∗
E −e aE · (π − πe)+ε
and πe and ε taken as given.







= e ΩEA · ε






To ﬁnd out the value of the unemployment gap prevailing in country i, we
have to substitute for the equilibrium values of π and πe in the random, national





1 − e ΩEA · e ai
´
· ε
After the relevant substitutions, the expected value of the welfare loss func-


















2- We now analyse the national aggregation strategy in an uncertain context.
In this framework, the Central Bank takes uncertainty into account by consid-
ering the expected value of the weighted average of the national loss functions
10with respect to the common distribution law of the e ai. Thus, the monetary






subject to the constraint of the N national (“random”) Phillips relationships:
Ui = U∗
i − e ai · (π − πe)+εi =1 ,2,...,N
and πe and ε taken as given.








= e ΩNA· ε





































Whatever the strategy followed by the common central bank (euro versus
national aggregation), the introduction of uncertainty in the model has two
eﬀects.
• First, the uncertainty in the transmission process (measured by σ2
a) has an
ambiguous eﬀect on welfare (either considered from the viewpoint of f WNA
or f WEA). On the one hand, it increases welfare through the presence of
the term bσ2
a in the loss function. On the other hand it aﬀects welfare
negatively because e ΩEA (or e ΩNA) depends negatively on σ2
a.T h u s , t h e
net impact of transmission uncertainty on welfare depends on the relative
strength of these two eﬀects. This result is in accordance with the liter-
ature (see Letterie (1997)) and allows for looking at the optimal level of
uncertainty with respect to welfare.
11• We also ﬁnd that e ΩEA < ΩEA and e ΩNA < ΩNA. This means that in the
case of transmission uncertainty the optimal inﬂation rate is less sensitive
to shocks than in the absence of uncertainty. This reﬂects the so-called
brainardian principle according to which the monetary authorities refrain
from counteracting shocks too much if they know that such an intervention
will add to the variability in the economy because of its random eﬀective-
ness. This smoothing eﬀect prevails in the model, whatever the strategy
followed by the monetary authorities.
3.2 Does uncertainty reinforce the case for a national per-
spective?
We are now ready to assess how the presence of uncertainty may impinge on
the choice between the two strategies we have envisaged so far.
1- We ﬁrst compare how transmission uncertainty aﬀects the optimal inﬂa-
tion rate under the two strategies.
Our main ﬁnding is that transmission uncertainty has a stronger impact on














. This diﬀerential eﬀect results
from the fact that σ2
a ≥ σ2




As a consequence, when uncertainty prevails, the impact of a shock on the
optimal inﬂation rate is reduced more when the authorities follow a national
aggregation procedure than when they use euro-aggregation (relative to the no
uncertainty case). Thus transmission uncertainty makes the central bank more
cautious under national than under euro aggregation. This result prevails even
if the random national Phillips slope parameters are correlated (see Annex B).
The diﬀerent results concerning the inﬂation rate may be summarized by
the following inequality chain (for a positive value of the common shock):
e πNA <
¡
e πEA <? > πNA¢
< πEA
2- Second we compare the welfare losses associated with the two strategies.
Again, this comparison favors the national aggregation procedure.




f WEA − f WNA
´



























































Compared to the certainty case (see equation(7)) the impact of uncertainty
on the welfare loss operates at two levels:
• On the one hand, it aﬀects the value of the reaction coeﬃcient (e ΩNA and








> (ΩEA) − (ΩNA)
• On the other hand, it acts also in an additive way, through the diﬀerence







These two eﬀects increase the loss from using euro aggregation relative to
the loss from using national aggregation. From the foregoing, we conclude that
transmission uncertainty reinforces the result that in the presence of asymme-
tries in the transmission process the monetary authorities should use a national
aggregation procedure rather than follow a euro aggregation strategy.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The design of monetary policies in a monetary union is particularly challeng-
ing. One such challenge arises from the fact that the member countries have
maintained many of their idiosyncrasies. These have the eﬀect of creating asym-
metries in the transmission of common shocks. In this paper we conﬁrmed that
when asymmetries in the transmission exist, the common central bank can im-
prove the quality of monetary policy making by using national information
about inﬂation and the output gap, instead of focusing only on the union-wide
aggregates.
The main contribution of this paper consists in analysing whether this con-
clusion holds when the authorities face uncertainty about these diﬀerent national
transmission processes. We found that this uncertainty reinforces the need to
13use national data on inﬂation and output gaps. The insistence of the ECB to
use only union-wide aggregated information about these variables is therefore
likely to be suboptimal.
5 References
Bean C. (1997), “The convex Phillips curve and macroeconomic policymaking
under uncertainty”, manuscript, London School of Economics, September
De Grauwe P. (2000), “Monetary policies in the presence of asymmetries”, Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies,v o l .38 (4), November, p. 593-612.
Dornbusch R., Favero C. and F. Giavazzi (1998), “Immediate challenges for the
European Central Bank”, Economic Policy, 26, April, p. 15-52.
European Central Bank (2001), “Monetary policy-making under uncertainty”,
Monthly Bulletin, January, p 43-55.
Gros D. and C. Hefeker (2002), “One size must ﬁt all: national divergences in
a monetary union”, German Economy Review,v o l .3 (3), August, p 1-16.
Heinemann, F., and H¨ ufner, F., (2002), “Is the View from the Eurotower
Purely European? National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy”, Discus-
sion Paper, Centre for European Economic Research, University of Mannheim,
N◦02 − 69, October.
Letterie W. (1997), “Better monetary control may decrease the distortion of sta-
bilisation policy: a comment”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics,v o l .99 (3),
September, p. 463 − 470
Meade E. and N. Sheets (2002), “Regional inﬂuences on U.S. monetary policy:
some implications for Europe”, International Finance Discussion Papers, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, N◦721, February.
Mihov I. (2001), “One monetary policy in EMU: monetary policy implementa-
tion and transmission in the European Monetary Union”, Economic Policy, 33,
October, p. 371-406
Peersman G. and F. Smets (1999), “The Taylor rule: a useful monetary bench-
mark for the euro area?”, International Finance,v o l .2 (1), April, p. 85 − 116.
S¨ oderstr¨ om U. (1999),”Monetary Policy under Uncertainty.”Ph.D. Dissertation,
Stockholm School of Economics.
6A n n e x e s
6.1 Annex A: loss comparison in the absence of uncer-
tainty
As seen p.8, the comparison of the losses favors the choice of a national aggre-
gation perspective with respect to one relying on a Union-wide strategy (see
equation (8)). This result comes from two eﬀects appearing in equation (6) and
which may play in opposite directions:
14• First, the Euro-aggregation strategy implies a higher volatility in the in-
ﬂation rate (ΩEA ≥ ΩNA). Indeed, under this strategy, the Central Bank
does not take the heterogenous structures of national transmission mecha-
nisms in the Union into account which would otherwise play as an incentive
to lessen the sensitivity of the optimal inﬂation rate to the supply shock.
This result obtains whether or not the weight on output stabilisation in





(1 − ΩEA · ai)




can be positive or negative. It can be shown (see infra)t h a t ,i nt h ec a s e





is large enough and the
output weight (b) in the loss function not too small, this term is positive.
In that case the national aggregation procedure contributes to reduce the
unemployment variability relative to the euro-aggregation strategy9.
To go further on the last result, let deﬁne the diﬀerential welfare loss from
the viewpoint of unemployment variability associated with a Union-wide aggre-







(1 − ΩEA · ai)
2 − (1 − ΩNA· ai)
2
i!





E · (ΩEA + ΩNA)
i





















































is positive, this second order
polynomial has two roots




















Thus, P (b) will be positive if and only if b ∈ [0 ; ∆1]a sb can only take
positive values.




















By the way, for θ2
aE and a2















































hyperbolic, monotonically decreasing function of θ2
aE.
dispersion coefficient
Thus, for small values of θ2
aE, P (b) will be positive whatever the value of b.
In this case, the (EA) strategy has to be favored. In the opposite case, when
16θ2
aE takes relatively large values, the interval on which P (b) will be positive is
of small magnitude. It is then possible that for relatively large values of b,t h e
(NA) strategy delivers a smaller (aggregate) volatility of unemployment than
the (EA) procedure.
6.2 Annex B: correlated Phillips curve slopes
Suppose that the distribution of the e ai has the following properties:
Ea (e ai)=ai, ∀i =1 ,...,N
cova (e ai,e aj)=
½
ρij if i 6= j
σ2
a if i = j i,j =1 ,...,N















The results obtained in the paper would be modiﬁed (qualitatively) by these
new assumptions if σ∗2
aE > σ2
a.B u t ,a sw ew i l ls e e ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s e .
Proof: let rewrite ρij in terms of the correlation coeﬃcient rij: ρij =
rij.
p
var(e ai).var(e aj), that is, ρij = rij · σ2
a. Moreover, we know that:
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